The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has designated 21 individuals and entities, along with one vessel, for their roles in transferring oil products, procuring weapons and dual-use equipment, and providing financial services to Ansarallah, also known as the Houthis. The move is intended to disrupt financial channels between Iran and the Houthis, building on earlier efforts to restrict the Iranian government’s ability to use oil revenues to support regional proxy groups.
According to Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, “The Houthis threaten the United States by committing acts of terror and attacking commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea. Treasury is taking action to cut off nearly two dozen individuals and entities involved in transferring oil, procuring weapons, and providing financial services for this Iran-backed terrorist organization. Treasury will use all tools at its disposal to expose the networks and individuals enabling Houthi terrorism.”
This latest action was taken under Executive Order 13224, as amended. The State Department previously designated Ansarallah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group effective February 16, 2024, and later as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on March 5, 2025.
Despite international sanctions, the Houthis continue to generate significant revenue from illicit oil sales—over $2 billion annually. The Iranian government supplies both sold and free monthly shipments of oil through companies based in Dubai. Several UAE-based companies—including Al Sharafi Oil Companies Services, Adeema Oil FZC (owned by Waleed Fathi Salam Baidhani), Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC, Alsaa Petroleum and Shipping FZC (owned by Imran Asghar), and Janat Al Anhar General Trading LLC—are identified as key facilitators for these operations.
Houthi leaders reportedly charge high prices for oil derivatives within Yemen while using proceeds for personal gain or military purposes. Zayd ‘Ali Ahmed Al-Sharafi uses his businesses Black Diamond Petroleum Derivatives and Al-Sharafi Oil Companies Services to manage imports/exports for Houthi-controlled authorities; he is also linked with sanction evasion activities via Janat Al Anhar in Dubai.
Other designated entities include New Ocean Trading FZE—a logistics provider that supported procurement of military equipment—and several exchange houses such as Al-Ridhwan Exchange and Transfer Company in Sana’a that facilitate payments related to arms purchases.
Weapons smuggling operations rely on a network spanning Yemen and Oman. Wadi Kabir Co. for Logistics Services operated warehouses used for smuggling attempts involving anti-tank guided missiles hidden inside fake generators from Oman into Yemen—seized by Yemeni authorities in 2022. Rabya for Trading FZC assisted these operations using its warehouse in Oman’s Al-Mayzunah Free Market Zone.
Aviation sector involvement includes attempts by Houthi operatives—collaborating with sanctioned businessman Muhammad Al-Sunaydar—to establish airlines Barash Aviation & Cargo Company Limited and Sama Airline out of Sana’a International Airport for smuggling/revenue generation purposes. In early 2025 they sought partnership with convicted arms dealer Viktor Anatolijevitch Bout to purchase aircraft.
OFAC also targeted maritime transporters who continued deliveries after an authorized wind-down period ended April 4, 2025; among them are shipping company Albarraq Shipping Co., its director Ebrahim Ahmed Abdullah Al-Matari, several ship captains including Ahmad Ismail (ALBARRAQ Z), Ahmad Adriss (SARAH), Ahmad Bseis (ATLANTIS MZ), Ranveer Singh (AKOYA GAS), Alexander Yurovich Pshenichnyy (VALENTE), all cited for supporting prohibited transactions post-FTO designation.
All property or interests belonging to those named are blocked if within U.S. jurisdiction or controlled by U.S persons; any entities majority-owned by blocked persons are similarly restricted. Transactions involving these parties are generally prohibited without OFAC authorization; violations may result in civil or criminal penalties under strict liability standards per OFAC’s enforcement guidelines.
Foreign financial institutions could face secondary sanctions if found facilitating significant transactions on behalf of those designated today; OFAC retains authority over correspondent accounts within U.S jurisdiction accordingly.
OFAC states that sanctions aim not just at punishment but at changing behavior: “The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.” Procedures exist for seeking removal from sanctions lists according to established guidance.
